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NOTES
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN NATIONAL
POLITICAL CONVENTIONS: AN IDEA
WHOSE TIME HAS COME
It is the recognized position in this country that courts... have no
power to interfere with political parties in the choice of their candi-
dates nor to regulate or control the methods and agencies by which
they are selected.
Brown v. Costen, 176 N.C. 63,
65-66, 96 S.E. 659, 660-61
(1918) (Hoke, J.)
The right to vote is too important in our free society to be stripped
of judicial protection ....
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7
(1964) (Black, J.)
In the early morning hours of July 11, 1972, the Democratic
National Convention refused to seat fifty-nine members of the Illinois
delegation elected in that state's primary of March 21, 1972.1 In so
doing, the Convention approved the finding of its Credentials
Committee' that these delegates were selected in violation of Demo-
cratic Party rules,3 even though they were elected in accordance with
Illinois law.4
' N.Y. Times,July 12, 1972, § 1, at 18, col. 7;see T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT
1972, at 174-76 (1973).
2 N.Y. Times, July 12, 1972, § 1, at 18, col. 7-8; see T. WHITE, supra note 1, at 164-66.
3 1968 Democratic Guideline C-6 provided:
In mandating a full and meaningful opportunity to participate in the delegate selec-
tion process, the 1968 Convention meant to prohibit any practice in the process of
selection which made it impossible for Democrats to participate. Since the process by
which individuals are nominated for delegate positions and slates of potential dele-
gates are formed is an integral and crucial part of the process by which delegates are
actually selected, the Commission requires State Parties to extend to the nominating
process all guarantees of full and meaningful opportunity [sic] to participate in the
delegate selection process.
117 CONG. REC. 32,917 (1971) (remarks of Senator McGovern). A hearing officer engaged by
the Credentials Committee found that the procedures used to select these 59 members of the
Illinois delegation violated that guideline because the delegates were
selected outside the arena of public participation by, and given the massive support
and endorsement of, the Democratic organization in Chicago ... to the exclusion of
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A few days before the Convention opened (but several days after
the Credentials Committee recommendation was made) the chal-
lenged delegates brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in
the District Court for the District of Columbia. 5 The delegates asked
the court to: (1) declare that they, the winners of the March primary,
were the only legitimate delegates to the Miami Convention from the
City of Chicago and (2) enjoin the Convention from adopting the
recommendation of the Credentials Committee to the effect that a
rival slate of Chicago delegates be seated. 6
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of ajusticiable
question.' On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia ruled that the case presented ajusticiable question, but sustained
the Credentials Committee decision on the merits.8 Then, within
hours of the opening of the Convention, the plaintiffs asked the
Supreme Court to stay the court of appeals judgment. The Court
granted the plaintiffs' request on the grounds that on matters of such
"great delicacy" it preferred to defer decision to the Convention. 9
other candidates not favored by the organization .... [Moreover, the procedures used
by the Democratic organization to endorse particular candidates for delegate positions
in the Illinois primary did not involve] written and publicized rules... [or] notice to the
public such as would permit interested Democratic electors to participate [in the party's
pre-primary endorsement procedure].
O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1972).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-5 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
s Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir.),judgment stayed, 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
6 See O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). The Illinois plaintiffs claimed that the
reform guidelines were unconstitutional. See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1,
221 (1972).
See O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 10 (1972); Keane v. National Democratic Party, Civil
No. 1320-72 (D.D.C.July 3, 1972) (unreported),rev'd, 469 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir.),judgment stayed,
409 U.S. 1 (1972).
O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 2 (1972).
9 Id. at 5. The Illinois challenge was only one halfof the Brown case. The other halfinvolved
a suit brought by a group of California delegates elected in that state's primary, but whose
credentials were also rejected by the Committee.
Senator George McGovern had won the California presidential primary ofJune 6, 1972,
with 45% of the popular vote. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 7. Under Cali-
fornia's winner-take-all system, however, the entire California delegation to the Democratic
Convention was pledged to the winner of the primary, regardless of the winning candidate's
percentage of the vote. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 6201 (West 1961). After losing the primary,
Senator McGovern's major opponents, Senators Hubert Humphrey and Edmund Muskie,
objected to this procedure, claiming that California Democrats who had expressed a preference
for candidates other than Senator McGovern would have no voice at the Convention. Such a
result would have been contrary to the spirit of the Call to the 1972 Convention which, in part,
provided:
It is understood that a State Democratic Party in selecting and certifying delegates
to the National Convention thereby undertakes to assure that such delegates have been
selected through a process in which all Democratic voters have had full and timely
opportunity to participate.
Schmidt & Whalen, Credentials Contests at the 1968-and 1972-Democratic National Conventions,
82 HARv. L. REV. 1438, 1456 (1969). But see T. WHITE, supra note 1, at 27-28.
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The Supreme Court's per curiam decision in O'Brien v. Brown'"
was predictable. Until the court of appeals decision in Brown, no
federal court had ever injected itself into the deliberative processes of
a national political convention." In past years, both federal and state
courts had assumed that intraparty disputes were essentially struggles
for political power, involving no questions of constitutional import.'
2
The action of the 1972 Convention in unseating the Illinois
delegates challenged this judicial assumption. It revealed the power
of a national political convention to restrict a citizen's access to the
machinery for electing the President of the United States.' 3 And, at
the very least, it called for a re-examination of those doctrines of law
and perceptions of history which have prevented the courts from
applying constitutional standards to the workings of national political
conventions.'
4
The district court refused to disturb the Credentials Committee decision, but the court of
appeals voted two-one to reverse the judgment below. Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563 (D.C.
Cir.),judgment stayed, 409 U.S. 1 (1972). The Supreme Court stayed the judgment of the circuit
court in the California challenge at the same time that it stayed the circuit court's decision on the
Illinois question. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972). However, in the case of the California
delegates, the Convention refused to follow the advice of its Credentials Committee and
avoided any further confrontation with the courts on the California question. N.Y. Times,July
12, 1972, § 1, at 19, col. 5.
10 409 U.S. 1 (1972). In addition to requesting that the Supreme Court stay thejudgment
of the court of appeals, the Illinois plaintiffs also petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari to
review the court of appeals judgment on the merits. Id. at 2. Although the Court granted the
petitioners' request to stay the lower court judgment, it took no immediate action on their
request for certiorari. Id. at 3-5. The Supreme Court apparently preferred to wait until the
beginning of the new term and consider this petition at the regular time.Justice Douglas, in his
dissenting opinion, pointed but that, of course,
[T]he petitions for certiorari [would] not be voted on until October, at which time
everyone knows the [case would] be moot. So the action [of the Court] granting the
stays [when combined with the denial of certiorari is] an oblique and covert way of
deciding the merits.
Id. at 6 (Douglas, J., dissenting). But see notes 135-40 and accompanying text infra.
"1 409 U.S. at 5; see Smith v. State Executive Comm. of the Democratic Party, 288 F. Supp.
371, 376 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
In recent years, some lower courts have ventured far enough into internal party processes
to oversee state managed procedures for the selection of delegates to the national convention.
See Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Georgia v. National
Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party,
343 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1972); Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Comm., 319 F. Supp.
673 (W.D. Wash. 1970). But see Stassen for President Comm. v. Jordan, 377 U.S. 914 (1964);
Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), affg 287 F. Supp. 794 (D.
Minn. 1968). For a possible explanation of the different results in these cases, see note 26infra.
" See Smith v. State Executive Comm. of the Democratic Party, 288 F. Supp. 371, 375
(N.D. Ga. 1968); Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F. Supp. 794, 805 (D. Minn.
1968). See generally R. HANSON, THE POLITICAL THICKET: REAPPORTIONMENT AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY (1966).
13 409 U.S. at 10.
'4 This Note will also explore the question of how a court could apply constitutional
standards to nominating conventions once it decides that it should do so. See notes 75-128 and
accompanying text infra.
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LEGAL OBSTACLES TO JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN PARTY AFFAIRS
The right of political parties to manage their own affairs has been
protected by the courts through at least two techniques. When courts
have been asked to intervene in intraparty disputes, they have
claimed that issues arising from such controversies were political
questions and therefore nonjusticiable.15 Or, on occasion, they have
avoided this procedural device1 6 entirely and have simply contended
that the Constitution includes substantive protections for political
party autonomy. 17 If a court were freshly to re-examine the immunity,
15 Irishv. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party,399 F.2d 119,121 (8thCir. 1968). A finding by
a court that a question is nonjusticiable does not mean that the court lacksjurisdiction to hear it.
The issues ofjurisdiction and justiciability are distinguishable. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
198 (1962).
In the instance of nonjusticiability, consideration of the cause is not wholly and
immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of
deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified ... its breach judicially
determined, and whether protection for the right can be judicially molded. In the
instance of lack ofjurisdiction the cause... [simply] does not "arise under" the Federal
Constitution, laws.., treaties ... [or] jurisdictional statute. .. [or is not] a case or
controversy [within the meaning of the Constitution].
Id. The question of jurisdiction, then, is one of judicial power; the question ofjusticiability is
only one of judicial policy.
A further policy limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal courts is the
doctrine of abstention. A federal court may abstain from exercising itsjurisdiction (1) when it is
asked to decide a case on federal constitutional grounds when that case can be decided on the
basis of state law (Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)), (2) when federal
judicial action would place the federal courts in needless conflict with a state's administration of
its own affairs (Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959)), and (3) in order to allow a state the
opportunity to resolve an unsettled question on its own law (Compare Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940), with Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943)). See
generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 196-208 (1970).
Like the doctrine ofjusticiability, the abstention doctrine represents a policy determination
by the federal courts that under certain circumstances, jurisdiction should not be exercised,
even though it could be. But see Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1824).The
Brown case does not appear to fit into any category of cases to which the abstention doctrine
applies.
16 But see Note, The Presidential Nomination: Equal Protection at the Grass Roots, 42 S. CAL. L.
REv. 169, 181 (1969).
17 See Note, Freedom ofAssociation and the Selection of Delegates to National Political Conventions,
56 CORNELL L. REv. 148, 153 (1970); cf. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961);
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
When state courts have dealt with the question, the results have been similar, but the
rationale has been ambiguous. The general rule in state courts has been that, in the absence of
statutory authority, thejudiciary cannot intervene in internal party affairs. See Fosterv. Ponder,
235 Ark. 660,361 S.W.2d 538 (1962); Morris v. Peters, 203 Ga. 350,46 S.E.2d 729 (1948); State
ex rel. Padgett v. Vanderburgh Circuit Court, 236 Ind. 43, 138 N.E.2d 143 (1956); Wallace v.
Cash, 328 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1959); Democratic-Farmer-Labor State Cent. Comm. v. Holm, 227
Minn. 52,33 N.W.2d 831 (1948); Phillips v. Gallagher, 73 Minn. 528,76 N.W. 285 (1898); State
exrel. McCurdy v. DeMaioribus, 9 Ohio App. 2d 280,224 N.E.2d 353 (1967); Wagoner County
Election Bd. v. Plunkett, 305 P.2d 525 (Okla. 1956); Wall v. Currie, 147 Tex. 127, 213 S.W.2d
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of political parties from judicial intervention, it would first have to
determine whether these traditional theories are still viable.
A. The Political Question Doctrine
No court will attempt to settle "political questions."18 Thejudicial
definition of that term, however, is not necessarily consistent with its
popular meaning. The fact thatBrown raises the issue of the right to
participate in the "political" process does not automatically mean that
the case presents a nonjusticiable political question.' 9
In Bakerv. Carr, 20 the Supreme Court defined a political question
as one which would involve the judiciary in a conflict with another
branch of the federal government.2' "The nonjusticiability of a politi-
cal question [then] is primarily a function of the separation of
powers. '22 The Court even provided several variations of the doc-
trine in order to illustrate how it might be applied in various situa-
tions:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly
according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a
political question, although each has one or more elements which
identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
•.. or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent reso-
lution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embar-
rassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question.23
816 (1948); State ex rel. Smith v. Bosworth, 145 W. Va. 753, 117 S.E.2d 610 (1960).
The cases do not always make clear whether state courts feel they have no power to oversee
party affairs without statutory authorization, or whether they feel they have the power, but do
not think that it is appropriate to use it.
18 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164-66 (1803); see Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946). See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 183-98 (1962); Friedelbaum,
Baker v. Can-: The New Doctrine ofJudicial Intervention and Its Implicationsfor American Federalism,
29 U. CHI. L. REv. 673 (1962); ScharpfJudicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
1" See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536,540 (1927). See also Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932).
20 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21 Id. at 210; see C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 45, 47-48.
22 369 U.S. at 210; see C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 45. Questions involving the guaranty
clause (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4) are also considered political questions. See 369 U.S. at 218-37.
See also Kirby, The Constitutional Right to Vote, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 995, 1004-06 (1970).
23 369 U.S. at 217 (emphasis added).
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This restatement has been used recently to hold that issues in-
volving the internal workings of a political party are nonjusticiable
political questions. 4 Although no court has ever argued that the
actions of a political party are due the same judicial deference as the
actions of either the President or the Congress, it has been held inIrih
v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 1 5 that delegate selection disputes are
political questions solely because they provide nojudicially discovera-
ble and manageable standards for their resolution. 26
The Irish analysis is a misapplication of the Baker rationale. The
phrase "lack of judicially manageable standards" was not meant to
give lower courts carte blanche to avoid deciding delicate questions7
The phrase must be used only in the context of the basic Baker
definition of a political question, that is, one which is essentially a
function of the separation of powers within the federal
government.28 A lack of judicially manageable standards is not an
independent criterion for a finding of a "political question." Rather,
the phrase is meant to be a possible explanation ofjudicial refusal to
act when confronted with a potential conflict with Congress or the
President and not with a political party.29
Of course, even if a court were to insist upon adopting the Irish
interpretation of Baker,3 ° it still does not automatically follow that
there are no judicially manageable standards for the resolution of a
controversy stemming from a political convention. The issues raised
in Brown involve fundamental first and fourteenth amendment
rights.3' And the Supreme Court has clearly stated thatjudicial stan-
dards for dealing with these questions "are well developed and
familiar. 3 2
14 See Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F. Supp. 794, 804 (D. Minn.),aff'd, 399
F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).But see Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302, 1305 (D.C.
Cir. 197 1); Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271, 1277 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 858 (1971).
25 287 F. Supp. 794 (D. Minn.), affd, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
26 399 F.2d at 121; 287 F. Supp. at 805. This was not the only reason why the Irish court
refused to intervene in the dispute. The plaintiffs brought suit within weeks of the opening of
the convention, leaving little time for the court to decide the matter and no time to give the state
party a chance to correct the alleged unconstitutional delegate selection procedures.
27 See 369 U.S. at 229; Comment, O'Brien v. Brown: The Politics ofAvoidance, 58 IOWA L. REv.
432,439-40 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law: Conventional Reluctance or Doctrinal Departure? The
Political Question Doctrine, 51 N.C.L. REv. 290, 298-301 (1972).
28 Thus, it might be argued that a reason why a confrontation between the courts and one
of the other branches of government is to be avoided is that if such a conflict did arise, there
would be no "judicially manageable standards for its resolution."
29 See notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra. But see Scharpf, supra note 18, at 517.
20 See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 873 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 410
U.S. 953 (1973); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689,700 (E.D. Pa. 1972),affdnem. sub non. Atlee v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
21 See notes 103-28 and accompanying text infra.
2 369 U.S. at 226.
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B. Constitutional Protections of Political Party Autonomy
Political parties are not mentioned in the Constitution. Yet their
obvious importance to the American political system has compelled
the courts to develop a variety of constitutional theories to protect
parties from unwarranted governmental interference.3 For exam-
ple, courts have found that the right of individuals to organize and
manage a political party is protected by the right of suffrage34 or the
right of assembly. 35 Once it was even held that the right of citizens to
form a political party was guaranteed simply as an inherent right of a
free people.36 More recent holdings, that political activities are pro-
tected by the first amendment guarantee of free political association,
buttress the earlier theories.3 7
These constitutional protections of a party's right to conduct its
own affairs are premised upon a judicial conception of political par-
ties as essentially private voluntary associations.3 8 This traditional
view of political parties, however, does not accurately reflect the
nature of political organizations in the twentieth century. For that
33 The constitutional theories designed to protect the integrity of political parties have
been developed to keep party management free from state regulatory legislation. See notes
42-44 and accompanying text infra. The political question doctrine, on the other hand, is
primarily a tool used by the courts to deny requests for judicial intervention in party matters
when individual litigants request the court to take some action relating to political parties. See
notes 19-31 and accompanying text supra. Since both theories have been used to safeguard
political party autonomy, it is not surprising that many courts confuse the two rationales. See
cases cited in note 18 supra.
"4 See, e.g., Sarlls v. Stateexrel. Trimble, 201 Ind. 88,166 N.E. 270 (1929);Exparte Wilson, 7
Okla. Grim. 610, 125 P. 739 (1912); Stateexrel. McGrael v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1,128 N.W. 1041
(1910). For a more recent treatment of the constitutional right to vote, see Kirby, supra note 22,
at 995-1014.
3' See, e.g., Britton v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 129 Cal. 337, 61 P. 1115 (1900); Riter v.
Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 109 P. 444 (1910). See also G. ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND
ASSOCIATION (1961).
"6 Davidson v. Hanson, 87 Minn. 211, 219, 92 N.W. 93, 95 (1902).
17 See Note, supra note 17, at 152-60. See also D. FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
ASSOCIATION '38-42 (1963); G. ABERNATHY, supra note 35, at 190-96.
The modern right of free association has developed primarily as a response to certain state
attempts to prevent black citizens from joining pressure groups such as the NAACP. See
NAACP v. Alabamaexrel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958). See also H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 65-121 (1965). The right to participate in political party affairs is
similarly guaranteed. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1947). Political partici-
pation is, of course, subject to some limitations. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 41 U.S.L.W. 5122 (U.S. June 25, 1973) (Hatch Act restrictions on
partisan political activities of federal civil servants reaffirmed); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961) (protection of national security against subversive organizations); Gerende v. Board
ofSupervisors ofElections, 341 U.S. 56 (195 1) (same); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948)
(political contributions made by labor unions subject to restriction).
" See Friedman, Reflection Upon the Law of Political Parties, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 65 (1956);
Starr, The Legal Status ofAnterican Political Parties, 34 Am. POL. Sm. REV. 439 (1940).Butsee Ricev.
Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 881 (1948).
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reason, the historic judicial recognition of general party autonomy is
no longer warranted.
1. The Evolution of American Political Parties
The first political parties were hardly more than informal groups
of men clustered around the philosophies of Hamilton orJefferson.3 9
These associations behaved quite differently from their modern
counterparts. They had no continuing organization, they fixed no
membership criteria, they wrote no platforms.4 0 Candidates were
nominated by "caucuses" or secret meetings of influential men.41
With the growth of Jacksonian democracy the character of
American political parties changed.42 Party organization and
nominating procedures became more complex, and the impact of
national political parties on the political process grew more
profound.43 Yet, in spite of these changes, the courts continued to
treat political parties as if they were still the private clubs of the
revolutionary period. Indeed, throughout most of the nineteenth
century, state attempts to establish minimal regulation of political
parties were continuously struck down.44
It was not until the Progressive Era (1880-1920) that the courts
began to tolerate some governmental interference in political party
affairs.45 Evidence of widespread political corruption convinced the
courts that reforms in this area were legitimate exercises of state
police power. 6 As a result, extensive state regulation of selected
phases of the political process became commonplace.4 7
39 Friedman, supra note 38, at 65.
40 Id.
41 Samuel Adams described one such gathering as follows:
This day learned that the Caucus Club meets at certain times in the garret of Tom
Hawes, the Adjutant of the Boston Regulars. He has a large house... and the whole
club meets in one room. There they smoke tobacco till you cannot see from one end of
the garret to the other. They drink flip I suppose and they choose a moderator who
puts questions to the vote regularly; and selectmen, assessors, collectors, firewards, and
representatives are regularly chosen before they are chosen in town ....
Id. at 65-66.
42 See S. LORANT, THE GLORIOUS BURDEN 13-128 (1968).
4' See A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON 30-44 (1945).
44 See, e.g., Britton v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 129 Cal. 337, 61 P. 1115 (1900).See also P.
DAVID, R. GOLDMAN & R. BAIN, THE POLTICS OF NATIONAL PARTY CONVETIONS 17-31 (1960);
Friedman, supra note 38, at 66.
'5 See, e.g., Ransom v. Black, 54 N.J.L. 446, 24 A. 489 (1892); Stateexrel. Plimmer v. Poston,
58 Ohio St. 620, 51 N.E. 150 (1898); DeWalt v. Bartley, 146 Pa. 529, 24 A. 185 (1892). See
Friedman, supra note 38, at 67-68; Note, Limitations on Access to the General Election Ballot, 37
COLUm. L. REv. 86, 90 (1937).
46 See, e.g., Stateexrel. Nordin v. Erickson, 119 Minn. 152, 156, 137 N.W. 385,386 (1912);
Stateexrel. McCarthy v. Moore, 87 Minn. 308,311, 92 N.W. 4, 5 (1902); Peopleexrel. Coffey v.
Democratic Gen. Comm., 164 N.Y. 335, 340, 58 N.E. 124, 125 (1900); R. HORN, GROUPS AND
[Vol. 59:107
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The Progressive Era reforms created a tension between the tradi-
tional notion of political party autonomy and the newly created, albeit
limited, interest of the state in party affairs. This friction was reflected
in the ambivalent manner in which national parties conducted their
business in the years following the Progressive Era.48 Convention
orators were quite willing to proclaim their party's supremacy over
state law.49 Yet, until the 1960's, conventions of both parties carefully
avoided actions which might ignite a confrontation with state
courts.
5 0
This willingness of the national conventions to avoid testing the
limits of their self-proclaimed supremacy had two consequences.
First, procedures by which delegates were chosen to the national
convention were rarely attacked by the national party.51 These pro-
cedures were established by state law and administered by state agen-
cies. Challenging them would only have led to further state-party
conflict.52 Second, the legal status of political parties was frozen. By
THE CONSTITUTION 96 (1956); Mitau, The Status of PoliticalParty Organization inMinnesotaLaw, 40
MINN. L. Rlv. 561, 576-78 (1956).
Such institutions as the Australian [secret] ballot and the direct primary could be upheld
only if the courts approved of state regulation of matters heretofore regulated by the parties
themselves. Friedman, supra note 38, at 66.
47 See generally V. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 168-78 (5th ed. 1964); C.
MERRIAM & L. OVERACKER, PRIMARY ELECTIONS (1928); L. OVERACKER, THE PRESIDENTIAL
PRIMARY (1926).
48 Segal, Delegate Selection Standards: The Democratic Party's Experience, 38 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 873, 874 (1970).
49 In the heat of the Eisenhower-Taft credentials fights during the 1952 Republican
National Convention,. Governor Alfred Driscoll of New Jersey proclaimed:
I have spent the best years of my life strengthening thejudicia system in my State. I
have a healthy respect for the American judicial system. I have also a healthy respect
for thejudicial system of Georgia. But I submit to you that this is the supreme court of
Republicanism and is the proper tribunal before which the issues raised by the contest
must be settled.
Id. at 874 n.5.
51 Thus, in 1912, the Democratic Convention modified its long-standing practice of en-
forcing the unit rule when to do so would have violated a newly enacted Ohio primary law. And
in 1916, the Republican Convention modified its rules calling for delegates to be selected by
congressional district in order to avoid a clash with states whose laws provided for delegate
selection on an at-large basis. Id. at 874-75.
51 Id. at 875. Segal argues that until 1964, the Republicans were less willing to accede to
state regulation of every aspect of delegate selection.Id. However, until 1964 it does notappear
that either party was willing to make a frontal assault on such laws. Schmidt & Whalen, supra
note 9, at 1446-50.
52 Although the convention is theoretically free to disregard such laws, individual dele-
gates are answerable to state authorities. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice, 1972). See also Segal, supra note 48, at 874 n.7.
In addition to the historical rationale, there are a number ofother possible explanations for
the willingness of past conventions to accept state regulation of the delegate selection process.
Some political scientists have argued that convention acquiescence in this area is merely a
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:107
avoiding conflict with state laws, the parties gave the courts no further
opportunities to delineate the right of national parties to- manage
their own affairs-especially in the context of a national convention,3 -
Thus, until the mid-1960's, credentials contests at national con-
ventions arose only over the loyalty of individual delegates to the
national party.54 The fact that a delegate (or delegation) was chosen
"undemocratically" was not relevant. These earlier challenges raised
only political issues, revolving around the question of what a national
party could do "within a framework which recognizes the claims of
individual conscience" to maintain itself as a viable entity.55
In 1964, however, this entire pattern changed. 56 In the context
of the civil rights movement of the mid-1960's, a number of Missis-
sippi delegates to the Democratic Convention were challenged be-
cause state party selection procedures were drawn to prevent blacks
from participating in the nominating process.57 In response to the
challenge, the Convention seated a token number of challengers and
demanded that the regular Mississippi Democratic Party stop its
discriminatory practices.58
This challenge raised a number of deeper questions that had not
been raised in the loyalty disputes. In a political system which makes
recognition of the concept of state sovereignty. P. DAVID, R. GOLDMAN & R. BAIN,supra note 44,
at 176-78. One political scientist traces the Democratic Party's acceptance of state involvement to
aJacksonian [sic] belief in the importance of local government. Truman,Federalism and the Party
System, in FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT 115-36 (MacMahon ed. 1955). Finally, it has
been argued that conventions have relied on state procedures because (1) the state regulations
seemed to reflect a general commitment to "due process" and (2) the credentials committee was
not equipped to look behind the form of those procedures. See Chambers & Rotunda, Reform of
Presidential Nominating Conventions, 56 VA. L. REV. 179, 211 (1970); Schmidt & Whalen, supra
note 9, at 1447-48. Of course, the proponents of this last analysis would point out that when state
procedures lose the appearance of "due process" the Convention is obligated to investigate
them in spite of the limitations of the Credentials Committee as a forum for deciding such
disputes.
"' See note 50 supra. But see Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 347, 361
(1963).
54 See Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 9, at 1440. See generally R. BAIN, CONVENTION
DECISIONS AND VOTING RECORDS (1960).
Probably the most extensive debate on the loyalty question in modern times occurred at the
1952 Democratic Convention. In the aftermath of the Dixiecrat defection to Strom Thurmond
in 1948, an oath to support the nominees of the party was imposed upon all national convention
delegates. Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 9, at 1440-42. In spite of some harsh rhetoric, loyalty
pledges do not seem to have much practical significance in the Democratic Party.Id. at 1442-45;
see Comment, The Democratic Party's Approach to Its Convention Rules, 50 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 553
(1956).
55 Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 9, at 1445.
56 T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1964, at 277-82 (1965); Segal,supra note 48,
at 877.
57 Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 9, at 1450 n.50.
51 Id. at 1450.
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the two major parties the only effective means of achieving national
power, the process of selecting delegates to the major national politi-
cal conventions becomes crucial. For a convention to make decisions
on delegate credentials solely on the basis of whether delegates were
chosen in accordance with its conception of democracy allows it to
effectively control that important aspect of the right to vote.59
The 1968 Convention did not reflect on the issues raised in
1964,60 but merely broadened the 1964 precedent. In Chicago, the
Democratic Party adopted an entirely novel approach to delegate
selection. It abandoned its traditional laissez-faire attitude toward
state party selection machinery and authorized a special commission
to set extensive guidelines for future conventions to follow.6 1 To
some extent the
59 Id. at 1456.
60 See T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968, at 274-85 (1969).
61 The Convention's action was prospective in nature and did not affect delegates elected
in 1968. Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 9, at 1438-40.
The decision to adopt new delegate selection guidelines was made after an extended and
bitter debate reflecting rather fundamental divisions in the party about the extent to which rank
and file members should take part in the nominating process. The majority report of the 1968
Credentials Committee recommended that the Call to the 1972 Convention include the follow-
ing language:
It is the further understanding that a State Democratic Party in selecting and
certifying delegates and alternates to the Democratic National Convention there[by]
undertakes to assure that all Democrats of the state will have meaningful and timely
opportunities to participate fully in the election or gelection of such delegates and
alternates.
Id. at 1455.
In addition, the Credentials Committee recommended the adoption of the following
resolution to accompany the Call:
[T]he Chairman of the Democratic National Committee shall establish a special com-
mittee to aid the State Democratic Parties in fully meeting the responsibilities and
assurances thus required for inclusion in the Call for the 1972 Convention, said
Committee to report to the Democratic National Committee concerning its efforts and
findings and said report to be available to the 1972 Democratic National Convention
and the committees thereof.
Segal, supra note 48, at 878.
Both of the recommendations of the Credentials Committee were adopted. However, a
number of delegates felt that the Call recommended by the Committee was too weak and
proposed adding the following language to the Call:
It is understood that a State Democratic Party in selecting and certifying delegates
to the National Convention thereby undertakes to assure that such delegates have been
selected through a process in which all Democratic voters had a full and timely
opportunity to participate.
In determining whether a state party has complied with this mandate, the conven-
tion shall require that:
(1) The unit rule not be used in any stage of the delegate selection process;
(2) All feasible efforts have been made to assure that delegates are selected
through party primary, convention or committee procedures open to public
participation within the calendar year of the National Convention.
Id. at 878-79.See also T. WHITE, supra note 1, app. B. It was over the addition of this language to
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notion of "state sovereignty" was abandoned in 1964, when the
Convention insisted that the state parties live up to a standard of
full racial equality, and that they modify state laws and party rules
when necessary. But the 1964 ruling affected comparatively few
states. The new 1968 "democratic selection" rule, on the other
hand, [required] a large number of states to reform their selection
procedures or risk having their delegations unseated at the 1972
Convention.
6 2
The Illinois delegates involved in Brown were unseated because they
were found to have been chosen in violation of procedures estab-
lished in accordance with the 1968 mandate.6 3
The handling of credentials challenges by the last three Demo-
cratic National Conventions raises questions about the wisdom of the
traditional judicial policy of noninterference in intraparty disputes.
The refusal of the courts to intervene in those controversies is based
on the assumption that political parties are private, voluntary associa-
tions whose autonomy is constitutionally protected. Although that
principle is well established,6 4 the courts have also recognized that
many of the functions performed by political parties are public in
nature.6 5 If political parties are now allowed to use uninhibited dis-
the Call that the most bitter fight over delegate selection procedures occurred. The additional
language was adopted by the narrow margin of 1350 to 1206. Segal, supra note 48, at 879.
The passage of this minority report was the single vote on which the McCarthy-
Kennedy-McGovern reform forces prevailed in the [1968] Convention. Although Vice
President Humphrey has since supported the new rule, he had not done so at the time,
and the dominant Humphrey majority on the... Committee opposed it. The passage
of the minority report... was surprising at the time, and the explanation for it remains
unclear. The following factors probably were involved: (1) confusion on the Conven-
tion floor which caused several delegations to ask the chairman to tell them what they
were voting on; (2) a desire on the partof delegates who hadjust voted down the last of
the minority reports on credentials to effect meaningful party reform and to satisfy the
Convention minority; and (3) a key Convention vote from Missouri, a solidly Hum-
phrey state, which cast all 60 of its votes for the minority report-apparently reflecting
a strong personal appeal from Governor [now Senator] Harold Hughes of Iowa and,
perhaps, a commitment to support rules reform made earlier when McCarthy sup-
porters in the state abandoned a credentials challenge and a lawsuit attacking the
state's use of the unit rule.
Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 9, at 1456 n.83. But see T. WHITE,Supra note 1, at 18-21.
It is not clear whether the Convention actually contemplated that future conventions could
unseat delegates elected in a primary under the guise ofenforcing procedures for "democratic"
selection of delegates. Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 9, at 1457.
6" Schmidt& Whalen,supra note 9, at 1456. For a further discussion of the meaning of the
Call (as amended), see id. at 1457-65.
63 See note 3 supra.The procedures established to implement the mandate of the 1968
Convention were drafted by the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection,
popularly known as the McGovern Commission. For the text of the reform guidelines, see 117
CONG. REc. 32,908 (1971) (remarks of Senator McGovern).
64 See Bellamy, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Allocation of Delegates to the
Democratic National Convention, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 892 (1970).
65 See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
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cretion in the manner in which they conduct their internal affairs,
they could effectively impair the opportunities for citizen participa-
tion in the political processjust as drastically as an election official who
refused "either to count [a citizen's] vote or to permit him access to the
ballot box."66
2. The Evolution of the Internal Party Affair
In assaying the history of American political parties, some courts
have facilely concluded that the judiciary has traditionally not become
involved in "internal party affairs. '67 This conclusion is troublesome,
for courts have involved themselves in party functions when particu-
lar abuses have required judicial attention.6 8
The problem here is one of terminology. When political parties
were private clubs, all party affairs could be considered "internal" and
therefore beyond the scope ofjudicial review. 69 However, as political
parties evolved from private associations into public institutions, and
official supervision of some of their affairs became inevitable, the
courts did not admit that their approval of government intervention
in party matters represented a fundamental change in judicial at-
titude. Rather, the public regulation of specific party functions was
justified on the somewhat obtuse ground that intervention was lim-
ited to regulating only the "external manifestations of party conduct"
and not the party's internal management.7 0
The relatively recent decision inLynch v. Torquato7l illustrates this
approach. There, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had to
decide whether to apply the Supreme Court's one-man-one-vote
principle to the election of a Democratic County Chairman in
Pennsylvania. 72 The court refused to apply that standard. More
significantly, the court used language that reveals both the logic and
limitations of the internal-external rationale.
The people, when engaged in primary and general elections for the
selection of their representatives in their government, may ra-
tionally be viewed as the "state" in action, with the consequence that
the organization and regulation of these enterprises must be such
66 Bellamy, supra note 64, at 892.
67 See Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F. Supp. 794,805 (D. Minn.),affd, 399
F.2d 119 (8thCir. 1968). TheBrown Courtcarefully avoided this overstatement. 409 U.S. at 4 -5.
68 See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
69 See notes 39-44 and accompanying text supra.
70 Freidman, supra note 38, at 69.
71 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965).
72 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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as accord each elector equal protection of the laws. In contrast,
the normal role of party leaders in conducting internal affairs of
their party, other than primary or general elections, does not make
their party offices governmental offices or the filling of these offices
state action which must satisfy the requirements of [the Consti-
tution] . . . 3
While this functional approach to internal party affairs might still
have some utility when applied to a state party, its flaws become
apparent when applied to current issues arising from a national
political convention. National convention delegates nominate their
party's candidates for the highest offices in the land and have the final
word on all questions relating to the management of the national
party itself. A delegate is, therefore, both a "government" and "non-
government" official within the Lynch rationale. Indeed, the Lynch
court frankly admitted the difficulties in applying the traditional
internal-external rationale to a national convention. 74
A clearer approach to the problem would be to return to the old
definition of an "internal party affair" as being any subject within the
ambit of a political party's responsibility. Courts (and commentators)
would then not have to wrestle with technical and confusing distinc-
tions between external and internal party matters, but could frankly
tackle the real question-when does the Constitution limit the au-
tonomy of political parties in the management of their own affairs?
II
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE RIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Once a court is willing to consider adjudicating a dispute arising
from the presidential nominating process of a national political party,
it will then have to apply substantive constitutional standards to indi-
vidual cases. Obviously, there are no direct precedents to guide a
court now willing to enter this unique and complex field.' 5 The
Supreme Court, however, has occasionally stepped into the nominat-
ing procedures of state parties when particularly invidious types of
discrimination (combined with legislative inaction) have compelled a
judicial remedy.
Two suits are most significant in this regard. In Smith v.
Allwright,76 discrimination against black voters in the Texas Demo-
73 343 F.2d at 372 (footnotes omitted).
4 Id. at 372 n.5.
7 See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
76 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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cratic primary justified Supreme Court intervention.7 7 More re-
cently, in Gray v. Sanders, 78 the Supreme Court applied what was to
become the rationale of the reapportionment cases 79 to a peculiar
Georgia nominating procedure which potentially disenfranchised
urban voters 8 0 In both of these cases, the Court found that party
77 On May 24, 1932, the Democratic Party of Texas passed the following resolution:
Be it resolved that all white citizens of the State of Texas who are qualified to vote
under the Constitution and laws of the State shall be eligible to [sic] membership in the
Democratic party and, as such, entitled to participate in its deliberations.
Id. at 656-57.
In compliance with this resolution, election judges in Harris County, Texas, refused to
allow the petitioner, a black citizen of the county, to vote in the 1932 Texas primary. The
Supreme Court Fvund that the petitioner had been denied his right to vote by virtue of his race
in violation of the fifteenth amendment. Id. at 664-66. Accordingly, the Court allowed his claim
for damages under 8 U.S.C. §§ 31, 43 (now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1983 (1970),
respectively).
78 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
79 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
80 Candidates for state-wide office in Georgia were nominated by a two-step process. After
party members voted in the regular primary (step one), the Democratic Party employed a
"county unit system" to make the final determination on the party's nominee for various offices
(step two).
Candidates for nominations who received the highest number of popular votes in a county
were considered to have carried the county and were entitled to two votes for each representa-
tive to which the county was entitled in the lower house of the Georgia General Assembly. A
majority of county unit votes nominated a United States Senatoror Governor, a"plurality of the
county unit vote nominated [other state officers]." 372 U.S. at 371.
The difficulty with this system was that a candidate who received fewer popular votes than a
competitor could, through the improper apportionment of legislative districts, receive the
nomination.
A different result was reached on somewhat similar facts in Forston v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231
(1966). The Forston dispute arose out of the 1966 gubernatorial election in Georgia. Three
candidates competed in that election: Howard Callaway (Republican); Lester G. Maddox
(Democrat); and Ellis Arnall (Independent). No candidate received a majority of the votes,
although Mr. Callaway led the field with 47.07% of the popular vote. Id. at 236.
According to a Georgia constitutional provision in effect in 1966, when no gubernatorial
candidate received a majority of the vote, the Georgia General Assembly selected a governor
from among the top two candidates. Id. at 232. As a result, the heavily Democratic General
Assembly elected Mr. Maddox governor even though he had received fewer popular votes than
his Republican opponent. Mr. Callaway's supporters then brought suit, claiming, on the basis of
Gray, that those who voted for Mr. Callaway would be disenfranchised if Mr. Maddox were
allowed to assume the governor's chair. By a five-four vote the Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff's prayer. Id. at 236.
One commentator explained the different results in Gray and Forston this way:
[11here were strong political reasons for not overturning the Georgia legislature's
choice of Lester Maddox. Forston was argued on December 5, 1966; on that same day,
the Court held that the Georgia legislature had violated the first amendment rights of
Julian Bond in disqualifying him from membership. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116
(1966). The Court's decision in Forston was announced just one week later, on De-
cember 12, 1966, and its political impact was lost on no one.
Note, Constitutional Safeguards in the Selection of Delegates to Presidential Nominating Conventions, 78
YALE L.J. 1228, 1241 nA9 (1969). Seegenerally Chambers & Rotunda,supra note 52, at 199-200.
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procedures were actually public functions8' and that therefore they
were governed by the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments."2 Since
the fourteenth amendment is an appropriate vehicle for court action
in the context of presidential nominations,8" the principles of Smith
and Gray serve as excellent points of departure for a discussion of the
application of constitutional standards to national political
conventions.8 4
A. State Action
In both Smith and Gray, the Court found state action, citing three
factors. First, both nominating procedures effectively limited the
choice of the electorate at the general election.8 5 Second, both proce-
dures were part of the machinery for choosing public officials.86
Third, both procedures were regulated by the state.8 7 For these
reasons, the Texas and Georgia systems constituted integral parts of
the election process, making the actions of the respective state parties
state action. 8 These same characteristics are also present in the
presidential nominating process.
1. The Effect of the Nominating Process on the General Election
The clearest point of similarity between the state and national
nominating procedures is the fact that the nomination of presidential
8" See generally Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946).
82 Smith was decided on the basis of the fifteenth amendment (321 U.S. at 666); Gray was
based on the fourteenth (372 U.S. at 376-81). However, both amendments demand a findingof
state action before their protections can be invoked, so on the state action issue both cases are
directly in point.
83 See notes 103-28 and accompanying text infra.
84 Some commentators question whether there is much validity left in the state action
concept as a limitation on either the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments. See, e.g., Silard, A
ConstitutionalForecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM.
L. REv. 855 (1966). Rather imprecise notions of state involvement (e.g., Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)) and state
regulation (cf. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,461-66 (1952)) have been used in
such a way that the concept is "circumscribed by very liberal borders." Note, One Man, One Vote
and Selection of Delegates to National Nominating Conventions, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 536, 538 (1970).
See also Black, The Supreme Court-Foreword, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967). However, in the
area ofjudicial regulation of a national convention, these concepts do present some difficulties,
if only because of the historic notion that the Constitution protects political party autonomy. See
notes 33-66 and accompanying text supra.
85 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. at 374-76; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. at 659-62. Compare
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), with Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
86 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. at 371; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. at 653.
87 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. at 370; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. at 663.
88 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. at 375; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. at 659. The "integral
relation" of a primary and a general election remains the same regardless of whether the
general election is contested or uncontested. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,318 (1941).
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candidates by the major political parties limits the effective choice of
the electorate at the general election to at least as great a degree as it
does on the state level. Indeed, the choice of the voter at the national
level is even more restricted than it is in a state or local election. 89
2. National Convention Delegates as Public Officials
Because political parties are no longer private associations of
individuals, it must follow that convention delegates are not members
of an exclusive club. Rather, they are officers of a public institution. 90
Although the position of convention delegates is not mentioned in the
Constitution, delegates have nevertheless been chosen to perform a
most significant public function-the nomination of the President
and Vice President of the United States. 9' They are the medium
through which sovereign power is exercised by the people.92 As such,
they are public officials in a very real sense.
3. State Involvement in the National Convention
The actions of national political conventions are not governed by
the election laws of any state. 93 However, the institution of the na-
tional convention could not exist without state acquiescence and
approval.
The Constitution provides that the legislatures of each state shall
select that state's delegation to the electoral college "in such Manner
" [T]he great mass of the American electorate is grouped into political pa rties, to one
or the other of which voters adhere with tenacity, due to their divergent views on
questions of public policy, their interests, their environment, and various other
influences, sentimental and historical. So strong with the great majority of voters are
party associations, so potent the party slogan, so effective the party organization, that
the likelihood of a candidate succeeding in an election without a party nomination is
practically negligible. As a result, evexy voter comes to the polls on the day of the
general election confined in his choice to those few candidates who have received party
nominations, and constrained to consider their eligibility, in point of personal fitness,
as affected by their party associations and their obligation to pursue more or less
definite lines of policy, with which the voter may or may not agree. As a practical
matter, the ultimate choice of the mass of voters is predetermined when the nomina-
tions have been made.
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 285-86 (1921) (Pitney, J., concurring); see Maxey v.
Washington State Democratic Comm., 319 F. Supp. 673, 678 (W.D. Wash. 1970). See also
Banzhaf, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REV.
303 (1968); Note, supra note 16, at 172-74.
9' See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra. But see 29 C.J.S. Elections § 85 (1965).
91 See generally Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1947).
92 Of course, not all public officials must be chosen by popular vote. Administrative
officials may be appointed to public positions without regard to popular sentiment. Sailors v.
Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967). Presumably, national convention delegates would not be
classified as "administrative" under the Sailors rationale. See Note, supra note 80, at 1244.
" See generally A. REITMAN & R. DAVIDSON, THE ELECTION PROCESS: VOTING LAwS AND
PROCEDURES (1972).
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as the Legislature thereof may direct."94 All states have adopted a
procedure whereby state party central committees-or their
equivalents-in each state nominate a slate of electors who are loyal to
that party's national ticket.9 5 The election of one of the two slates to
the electoral college will depend, of course, upon the popular vote for
President in that state.96
If each state party did not have the power to nominate presiden-
tial electors, the national conventions would have little significance.
The names of its nominees would simply not appear on the ballots
which are printed under state auspices. Thus, each state has carefully
tailored its electoral process to enable the national convention to
nominate a presidential ticket.9 7
The relationship of the national convention to each of its
affiliates in the individual states is analogous to the relationship be-
tween the Jaybird Association and the Democratic Party of Texas,
examined by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Adams. 8 In that case, the
Court held that the Jaybird Association was a public agency, 99 even
though it was free from state regulation. The private election which it
conducted prior to the state-run Democratic primary consistently
dictated the winner of that primary. The Jaybird election thereby
made the state-operated nominating machinery perfunctory'00 just
as the action of the national convention makes the official procedure
for the designation of slates of electors a mere formality.
What distinguishes the national convention from the Jaybird
primary is that the former is a meeting of representatives from all the
states, but the Jaybird Association was composed of members from
only one state. Even though each state party chooses the person who
will head its ticket in concert with all the other state parties, the
national convention, like the Jaybird primary, has "become an in-
tegral part, indeed the only effective part, of the [nominating]
94 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, ci. 2.
95 L. LONGLEY & A. BRAUN, THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM 29, 188 n.18
(1972). Loyalty to the party is usually the most important qualification for appointment to the
electoral college. "[A]s one well-known 1968 elector reported: 'My finest credentials were that
each year I contributed what money I could to the party.' "Id. at 28-29.
96 Electors are not legally bound to vote in a manner consistent with their pledges, and on
rare occasions pledges are violated. Id. at 4-5. The method by which electors are chosen by the
parties has a certain "chilling effect" on elector independence, however. See note 95 supra.
97 In recent years some states have permitted slates of"unpledged electors" to be placed on
the ballot, thereby allowing voters to circumvent the nominees of the major parties. L. LONGLEY
& A. BRAUN, supra note 95, at 4-5. However, this phenomenon is still quite rare. Id.
98 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
99 Id. at 466.
100 Id. at 469.
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process." '' This difference means only that on the presidential level
all states act simultaneously on one phase of the question of "who shall
rule and [who shall] govern."'' 0 2
B. Substantive Constitutional Standards
A court should have no difficulty in applying substantive con-
stitutional standards to convention deliberations. The Supreme
Court's attitude on questions involving political participation has
been concisely summarized: "Any restriction on a person's ability to
participate in the political process must be carefully scrutinized in a
society where basic decisions are made and gain acceptability through
the political mechanisms of a representative democracy."' 0 3
The heart of political participation is the right to vote." 4 The
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides the
most significant safeguard for this fundamental right'0 5 by protecting
it against unreasonable discrimination.' 0 6 The due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment might also be applicable, for procedural
guarantees are inherent in any effective protection of voting
rights.10 7
The action of the 1972 Convention arguably infringed upon the
right of a majority of Chicago primary voters to have their votes
101 Id.
102 Id.; see Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
103 Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1129 (1969); see
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
104 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968). See generally Kirby,supra note 22, at
1003-14.
The right of political association is also included within the ambit of the right of political
participation. However, the right to vote clearly takes precedence over associational guarantees:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having avoice in the election of
those who make the laws under which ... we must live. Other rights, even the most
basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
1'5 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17
(1964).
1o6 A. BICKEL, THE NEW AGE OF POLITICAL REFORM 43-44 (1968). The right to vote has
been protected against numerous abuses. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)
(racially biased gerrymandering); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (outright racial
discrimination in party primary); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (vote fraud);
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (destruction or alteration of voting fists); Ex parte Yar-
brough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (physical coercion).
The Congress has also acted vigorously to protect the right to vote, especially in the face of
racial discrimination. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973a-p (1970). See
generally U.S. CONM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (1968).
107 See Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904); Chambers & Rotunda, supra note 52, at
203-04. But see Note, supra note 80, at 1237-38.
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counted.10 8 Whether those voters' rights were violated depends on
the answer to two questions. First, is the right to vote in a presidential
primary included in the right to participate in the political process? 10 9
Second, if the right of political participation is applicable to Brown,
does it limit the rights of the states (and therefore the conventions) to
choose presidential electors under article II of the Constitution?
1. The Right To Vote in a Presidential Primary
The right of a citizen to vote in a state primary was guaranteed in
the white primary cases. 110 The essential justification for this result
was that the primaries formed an integral part of the election
process."' The heart of these decisions was the conclusion by the
Court that for political participation by any citizen to be meaningful,
rank and file party members must have some voice in the nomination
of candidates by the major parties. The Court held that the right to
108 The Chicago delegation which was actually seated by the Convention was composed of
party members who had run for delegate positions in the Illinois primary, but who had been
defeated by the very people whose seats they were attempting to occupy. N.Y. Times, July 12,
1973, § 1, at 18, col. 8.
109 Not all convention delegates are chosen by presidential primaries. However, the argu-
ments for political participation applied to primary states are equally applicable in states where
rank and file members choose delegates by other means (e.g., state conventions).
The idea of Presidential primary elections is so naturally tailored to the American
experience in democracy that no one can name its father or date its origins-except
that it was born before the turn of this century somewhere "out west," as a periodic
wave of American restlessness came to crest in the Populist-Progressive movement.
People, ordinary people-so ran the thought-should have the right to go into dosed
voting booths and there accept or repudiate the party bosses in naming the party's
candidates to govern them.
T. WHITE,supra note 1, at 70. In 1972, 22 states held various types of Presidential primaries.Id.
at 72 n.2.
11 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d
391 (4th Cir. 1949); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875
(1948).
The abuse which the Court sought to curb in the white primary cases was racial discrimina-
tion. However, as the reapportionment cases indicate, the right to participate in the political
process is not protected against racial discrimination alone. See Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Rather, "the denial to the voter of an effective voice at the
effective locus of effective decision-making is equally impermissible" regardless of the discrimi-
nation involved. Note, supra note 80, at 1246-48. Rather than the racial minorities involved in
the white primary cases and the urban minorities in the reapportionment cases, delegates
representing a majority of Chicago Democratic voters sought relief in Brown, but this did not
make the deprivation of voting rights any less severe.
"I United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). This reasoningwas also used by the Court
in holding that primaries were public functions. See notes 70-81 and accompanying textsupra.
The finding of state action and the finding of a violation of substantive constitutional rights are,
of course, "integrally related."
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exercise a choice between thefaits accomplis of the major parties in the
general election was not an effective means of political expression." 12
The logic of the white primary cases applies with even greater
force to the presidential nominating process. Because the selection
of a president is the most important decision the electorate makes,1 13
the impact of the major party nominations is more profound, 1 4 and
the weight of one vote is more limited, in the general election than in
elections on the state level. 1 5 It follows that participation in the
selection of a presidential nominee deserves even higher priority than
participation in the nomination of lesser officials. In applying the
rationale of the white primary cases to the problem raised by Brown,
the comment of Mr.Justice Fortas, dissenting in Forston v. Morris, 1 16 is
especially relevant:
We have not heretofore been so beguiled by changes in the scenery
that we have lost sight of principle. Here, too, we are dealing at least
with the "impairment" of the vote-indeed, with the obliteration of
its effect. It is not merely the casting of the vote or its mechanical
counting that is protected by the Constitution. It is the
function-the office-the effect given to the vote, that is
protected.117
2. State Discretion Under Article II
Assuming the right to participate in the political process extends
to voters in a presidential primary, one argument might still be used
to maintain that this right can be limited by a political convention. The
action of a national convention is state action because it forms an
integral part of the process by which states select electors to the
electoral college.' 18 However, the broad language of the constitu-
tional provisions conferring that responsibility on the states might be
interpreted as meaning that the discretion of the states in this area is
unlimited." 9 If this is so, then the latitude of the national convention
as the arm of the state would be unlimited as well.' 20
112 Chambers & Rotunda, supra note 52, at 197-98; see note 89 and accompanying text
supra.
,, See Note, supra note 80, at 1245-46.
114 p. DAVID, R. GOLDMAN & R. BAIN, supra note 44, at 70.
115 See note 89 supra.
116 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
117 Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
118 See notes 85-102 and accompanying text supra.
119 "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in the Congress .. " U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
120 The national convention is an agent of the state for the purpose of making the effective
choice of presidential electors. See notes 87-95 and accompanying text supra.
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The Supreme Court reviewed the power of the states to choose
presidential electors in Williams v. Rhodes. 121 In that case, the Ohio
affiliate of Governor George Wallace's American Independent Party
brought suit to challenge an Ohio statute that required third-party
presidential candidates to obtain the signatures of a number of regis-
tered voters equal to fifteen percent of the votes cast in the last
gubernatorial election in order to get his name on the ballot.' 22 The
Court found the Ohio statute unconstitutional because "no State can
pass a law regulating elections that violates the Fourteenth Amend-
ment .... -123 Indeed, it was in Rhodes thatJustices Black and Harlan
clearly enunciated the right of effective political participation. 24
Although Rhodes did not specifically deal with the presidential
nominating process, the impact of its logic on that subject may be
significant. The Rhodes Court recognized that during the 1968 elec-
tion, the views of a substantial minority of Ohio voters seemed to have
been ignored by the major parties. 25 If these voters had been pro-
hibited from voting for Governor Wallace, their right to effectively
participate in the political process would have been seriously im-
paired.
As a practical matter, truly effective political participation is
rarely achieved through third-party movements. 26 Even the most
charismatic of third-party leaders is unlikely to prevent one of the
two-party candidates from achieving a majority in the electoral
college.' 27 Effective political participation is the objective thatRhodes
found in the Constitution, and that goal can best be realized when
participation within the two major parties is guaranteed. As Governor
Wallace's experience in 1972 amply demonstrated, the process of
compromise and coalition-forming which takes place as the major
conventions approach, offers the most substantial opportunity for
real political impact.' 28 -
121 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
122 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.01 (Anderson 1967).
1223 93 U.S. at 29. The Court did not indicate the extent to which the states could
legitimately limit the access of presidential candidates to the ballot. See Note, One Person One
Vote: The Presidential Primaries and Other National Convention Delegate Selection Processes, 24
HASTINGS L.J. 256, 259-60 (1973).
124 393 U.S. at 30-34, 41-48; see Kirby, supra note 22, at 1003.
125 393 U.S. at 32-33.
126 V. KEY, supra note 47, at 254-81.
127 George Wallace's experience in 1968 illustrates the limits on the possible effectiveness
of third-party movements within the American political system. T. WHITE, supra note 60, at
400-01. The experience of the Progressive ("Bull Moose") Party, captained by former President
Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, proves the same point. V. KEY, supra note 47, at 263-65.





The courts have the power to oversee the activities of a national
political convention. 129 There are a number of practical problems,
however, which might limit court involvement. The most obvious of
these is time.1 30 As Brown vividly illustrates, lawsuits in this area are
likely to arise on the eve of the national convention since most dele-
gates are not selected very far in advance. 13 1 This presents a court
with a dilemma. If it decides the case immediately, it will not have had
much of an opportunity to reflect upon the issues raised. If it consid-
ers the case carefully, however, the court might hand down its opin-
ion during, or even after, the convention. In that situation, judicial
intervention could throw the entire political process into chaos.' 32
The injuries which can arise out of a national convention, how-
ever, may recur every four years; controversies like those surround-
ingBrown are therefore continuing ones. Consequently, a court may
want to decide the merits of a case even though it is unable to grant
of the struggle for political power among men who may have contradictory interests
and often mutually exclusive hopes of securing them. This the- parties do by in-
stitutionalizing the struggle and emphasizing positive measures to create a strong and
general agreement on policies.
Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F. Supp. 794, 805 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 119
(8th Cir. 1968).
129 See notes 85-128 and accompanying text supra.
130 A remedy also might not be granted if it is too difficult to administer or if it is unlikely to
be obeyed. See Note, Regulation of Political Parties: Vote Dilution in the Presidential Nomination
Procedure, 54 IowA L. REv. 471, 485 (1968).
In addition, if a suit is brought close to the time that the convention is scheduled to convene,
a court probably will be in summer recess, thereby creating another practical problem. Cham-
bers & Rotunda, supra note 52, at 205.
131 Indeed, one of the reforms mandated by the 1968 Convention was the requirement
that all delegates to future conventions be chosen in the same calendar year that the convention
is to be held. Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 9, at 1456.
132 If a decision on a credentials challenge were handed down during a convention, the
court might be forced to stop the convention "in midstream." 409 U.S. at 10. If the court
reached a decision a few weeks after the convention adjourned, it might be forced to declare the
convention null and void and require that another convention be convened. Id. More omin-
ously, if the court reversed a convention decision after the presidential election, it theoretically
could be forced to declare the entire election invalid.
These eventualities, of course, will probably not occur. Courts are most unlikely to adopt
such drastic remedies. This is not to say that such remedies are totally inconceivable.
[T]he court may direct a re-assembling of any [state nominating] convention or the
holding of a new primary election where a [state] convention or primary election has
been characterized by such frauds or irregularities as to render impossible a determi-
nation as to who rightfully was nominated or elected ....
N.Y. ELECTION LAw § 330(2) (McKinney 1964). See Lowenstein v. Larkin, 40 App. Div. 2d 604,
335 N.Y.S.2d 799 (2d Dep't),aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 654,288 N.E.2d 133,336 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1972).See
generally The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 6, at 223-28.
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relief in the instant election.' 33 "By restricting relief to subsequent
[conventions], the courts would increase the availability of potential
[equitable] remedies since the time factor is eliminated as a significant
limitation.' ' 34
Arguably, if a court heard a preconvention lawsuit but then
allowed the convention to pass before decreeing (prospective) relief,
there would be some question of mootness. However, the Supreme
Court's decision inMoore v. Ogilvie' 35 suggests that mootness need not
present a problem here. In Ogilvie, a group of independent elector
candidates sought relief against the enforcement of an Illinois statute
which made it nearly impossible for the names of independent elector
candidates to be placed 6n the ballot. 36 Notwithstanding that the case
-was argued and decided after the 1968 election had been held,' 37 the
Court found for the plaintiffs on the merits.'13  On the question of
mootness, the Court held that when a "problem is 'capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review,"'139 mootness will not preclude adjudica-
tion. Thus, even if time preventsjudicial relief for particular litigants
in a preconvention dispute, a prospective (equitable) remedy is still
available.'
40
In past years, the courts believed that the best way to facilitate
participation in the political process was by remaining aloof from it.
However, as the demand for political participation has grown
stronger without a corresponding increase in the ability of the major
parties to cope with it, this laissez-faire attitude of the courts has been
shown to be misplaced. Indeed, by speaking eloquently on the right of
"' Chambers & Rotunda, supra note 52, at 205 n.109.
"3 See Note, supra note 130, at 485. Prospective relief may raise a question of standing. A
court will act only when a plaintiff has been harmed or is immediately threatened with harm.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,504 (1961). Thus, it is unlikely that a plaintiff would have standing
to sue unless and until there is some real possibility of a convention denying him the right to
participate in the nominating process. This prospect might arise too late for the court to give
relief. See, e.g., Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119, 120 (8th Cir. 1968).
However, a plaintiff might have standing to bring a suit well in advance of the convention if he
could show that he has regularly participated in the nominating process in the past and plans to
continue doingso in the future. Cf. Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.),cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858
(1971); Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Comm., 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970);
Smith v. State Executive Comm. of the Democratic Party, 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968). See
also Note, supra note 30, at 473.
135 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
Mr Id. at 815.
137 Id. at 814.
138 Id. at 819.
139 Id. at 816, quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
14' The remedies relied upon in the reapportionment cases might be helpful if a court
chose to review state regulation of the delegate selection process (as opposed to the action of the
national convention). See Note, supra note 130, at 485-86.
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political participation and then refusing to protect that right in the
most important arena of all, the Supreme Court has effectively un-
dercut its own precedent.
If a court is unable or unwilling to grant prospective relief, it
could consider the possibility of granting monetary damages to those
whose right to vote has been infringed. 4 ' Since the action of a
convention is state action, party leaders who deny rank and file party
members the right to vote, deprive those voters of a right guaranteed
to them by the Constitution.' 42 Such an infringement may be com-
pensated by monetary damages.1 43 This remedy may be particularly
valuable if a court finds that a convention dispute is not recurring and
therefore not a proper subject for equitable relief.
To supplementjudicial supervision, Congress could provide ad-
ditional assistance to those wishing to participate in the nominating
process. Congress has inherent power to regulate presidential
elections. 4 4 Indeed, federal regulation of such matters as campaign
contributions to presidential candidates 45 has been sustained on the
basis of this inherent power.' 46
In addition, Congress could exercise its power under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment 47 to guarantee an equal and effective
voice in the electoral process to all party members.
Finally, the impact of the national party conventions on interstate




As American political parties have evolved from private associa-
tions to public institutions, many of their functions have fallen within
141 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
12 See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 650, 661-62 (1944).
143 See note 141 supra.
144 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 n.7 (1970); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S.
534 (1934).
"5 Federal Election Campaign Actof 1971,86 Stat. 3 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18
& 47 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1973)).
146 Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
147 "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5; see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)
(Congress has wide latitude to determine whether state procedures violate equal protection
clause). See generally Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 99-108 (1966).
14 Since United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918), Congress has had the power to regulate noncommercial activities if they
affect interstate commerce. See Chambers & Rotunda, supra note 52, at 207.
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the orbit of government regulation. National political conventions,
however, have not been affected by this trend and have been able to
conduct their vitally important business without outside interference.
Although convention autonomy may have been valuable in the past,
the events surrounding O'Brien v. Brown illustrate the danger which
such unlimited discretion now poses for the rights of rank and file
party members. The time has come for the courts to take a fresh look
at their old notions of party independence and recognize the full
breadth of the individual citizen's right of political participation. 149
Mark D. Nozette
149 For a discussion of the possible scope ofjudicial review once the courts enter the field of
political conventions, see The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 6, at 229-34.
